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The Age of Infrastructure:
The Triumph and Tragedy of the
Progressive Civil Religion
Joseph Kiernan
“And what is faith? It is not born solely or largely by the actions
of one but through the contributions of millions living in the
spirit of justice, with due consideration for the burdens and
rights of all others.”
– Senator George W. Norris (R-NE)1
INTRODUCTION
During the 1930s, simmering progressivism erupted
into furious activity, initiating the Age of Infrastructure in the
United States of America (U.S.). After decades of piecemeal
development of roads and railways at the hands of states and
private corporations, Washington, D.C. took command. Gone
were the railroad cabals of Charles Crocker, James J. Hill, Mark
Hopkins, Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius
Vanderbilt. Now, economic crisis and rural poverty had galvanized
unprecedented popular support for government intervention.
Under the guidance of ideological heavyweights, the federal
government seized the reins of infrastructure development
in the United States, fusing decades of stewing resentment of
corporate greed with a New Deal checkbook. Commissions,
rather than corporations, laid asphalt, hung wire, bridged valleys,
and dammed rivers. It was an era in which men of a singular,
unstoppable vision—David Lilienthal, George W. Norris, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt—acquired the means to substantiate their
dreams.
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Thus, this is the story of Senator George W. Norris, a
Republican from Nebraska, who fought to expand government
to an unprecedented level in his crusade against poverty and
injustice. The bane of the imperious Speaker Joseph Cannon
(R-IL), Norris took on distinguished industrialist Henry Ford
and won. Norris also challenged his own political party with his
unyielding beliefs, leaving a legacy of concrete and light.
In his devotion to the progressive cause, Norris earned
no shortage of foes. Consequently, this is also the story of his
opponent, a Democrat-turned-Republican named Wendell
Willkie of Indiana, who fought Norris and the Senator’s creation,
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in an effort to protect
free enterprise from government coercion. Willkie, armed with
a passion that earned him national notoriety and widespread
respect, sought to check the excesses of the “progressive civil
religion of infrastructure” when its adherents, empowered by
the government, began to infringe on the fundamental values of
freedom. The TVA survives as an enduring symbol of the New
Deal, but its roots reached deeper than the Executive Branch’s
campaign against the blight of the Great Depression (19291939).
The progressive civil religion did not emerge ex nihilo in
the tempestuous first hundred days of the New Deal. Its origins
were older, growing in the Great Plains among disaffected farmers
and in the parlors of Boston’s Brahmins. Its adherents ranged
from the Protestant Nebraskans who sent George W. Norris to
Congress for almost forty years, even when he committed the
most egregious of political heresies, to the social reforming elite
of Manhattan, who handed a young, brilliant civil servant named
Robert Moses the power to reshape their world. The progressive
civil religion took many shapes such as, inter alia, the campaigns
of trustbusters and yellow journalists to curb corporate power,
the conservationism of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford
Pinchot, and Social Security. However, in doing so, the New Deal
empowered a unique strain of the ecumenical progressive civil
12
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religion: a progressive crusade for infrastructure. This was the
faith of Norris, mixing agrarian nationalism, progressivism, and
populism with a deep distrust of capitalism and an unrelenting
confidence in the altruistic potential of government.2 This radical
denomination, the constant frustration of internationalists and
free marketers, was built on a core belief that the government’s
role was not only to moderate and to regulate the excesses of
American capitalists, but also to serve as the egalitarian vanguard
of a better, fairer society.
In the pursuit of its agenda, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s administration handed the instruments of state to
men such as Norris to build infrastructure for the American
people and to engineer a new society. When unchecked, the
progressive civil religion led down a dark road to paternalism and
arrogant trampling of core American economic freedoms. At its
worst, the progressive civil religion of infrastructure was a selfrighteous crusade for a moral, just society that denigrated the
folly of individualism and the American belief in productive selfadvancement. However, when moderated by legitimate criticism
and motivated by unflagging commitment to the national need,
this liberal creed could master the natural power of the United
States for the common good, and uplift millions to the American
Dream. Its prophets seized upon a unique moment in American
history, carving the physical scripture of this populist faith into
the land for posterity.
THE ROAD TO MUSCLE SHOALS
The series of events that led to the birth of the TVA
began far across the Pacific Ocean in the tense summer months
of 1914. The spiraling diplomatic crisis in Europe spurred
tensions that reverberated throughout the Kaiser’s Pacific
possessions. As war threatened to break out across Europe,
German Vice-Admiral Maximillian Reichsgraf von Spee, on tour
with the battleships SMS Scharnhorst and SMS Gneisenau en route
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to Truk in Micronesia, contemplated the options for his fleet,
the German East Asian Cruiser Squadron. Should the pressures
of the summer erupt into armed conflict, Germany would have
limited naval resources abroad to defend its Pacific possessions.
The Triple Entente Powers, especially Britain and her
bilateral ally Japan, had relative naval superiority in the Asian
Pacific Rim. Ultimately, when the July Crisis degraded into the
inception of the First World War (1914-1918) in August, Spee
opted to sail towards South America, seeking neutral colliers
and plotting a path back towards the Fatherland. British and
American naval strategists eyed Spee’s voyage with concern as
the Germans cruised toward Cape Horn, Chile. Although the
East Asian flotilla faced defeat at the hands of the British Royal
Navy off the Falkland Islands, the German escapades in the
Pacific, combined with the privateering cruiser SMS Emden’s
activities near British India, unnerved the Triple Entente Powers.
The German naval presence off the Chilean coast raised
concerns in the United States, a neutral but nervous power.3 At
the time, Chile was the major exporter of nitrates to the U.S.,
critical for producing fertilizers and explosives, both resources
of profound strategic importance. In the arid northern reaches
of the long littoral country, huge nitrate deposits at Antofagasta
and Tarapacá attracted foreign firms from Britain, Germany,
and the United States to harvest this vital ingredient for modern
agriculture and weaponry.4
With the advent of hostilities, the Germans, now cut off
from global trade by the British blockade, developed nitrogen
fixation methods (the Haber process) to produce sufficient
materiel domestically. The German innovations and German
investments in hydroelectric energy to power the nitrate
production ensured a steady supply of shells for Krupp guns in
northern France. They also helped feed the hungry Reich, where
the agricultural output per acre outpaced most peer countries.5
The United States, however, had no reserve supply of nitrates,
was still reliant on Chilean imports.6 In a time of global war and
14
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commerce raiding, the sea lines of communication to Tarapacá
seemed more vulnerable than ever.
As the specter of armed conflict loomed, American
military planners fretted over the nitrate problem. On December
27, 1915, Brigadier General Crozier, the U.S. Army Chief of
Ordnance, called for the development of air-made nitrate
production in the United States. With the potential for U.S.
involvement rising, the United States’ dependency on Chile for
critical munitions became a political issue. German privateering
and heightened submarine warfare in the North Atlantic Ocean
demonstrated how hostile maritime activity could interdict trade,
potentially debilitating American military preparedness.7
On June 3, 1916, in response to the mounting likelihood
of war, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense
Act (NDA), a comprehensive bill to reorganize and modernize
the armed forces of the United States.8 The nitrate issue was
a component of the broad legislative initiative. Under pressure
from Muscle Shoals, Alabama, where business interests and
impoverished southerners backed the construction of a dam
and a nitrate plant along the Tennessee River, Senator Oscar
Underwood (D-AL) fought to include Section 124 in the NDA,
the “Nitrate Supply.” Section 124 “empowered” the President to
“determine the best, cheapest, and most available means for the
production of nitrates…upon any…river” and authorized the
Executive “to construct, maintain, and operate…dams, locks,
improvements to navigation, power houses…for the generation
of [electricity]” and “the production of nitrates.”9 Muscle
Shoals, positioned along the mighty Tennessee River, was an
ideal location. The federally-run project would direct millions of
federal dollars into the needy region and jumpstart an industrial
awakening in a significant portion of the sleepy South.
In the early twentieth century, the Tennessee Valley had not
shared in the economic prosperity brought by industrialization.
The region, following the river from its sources in western
Virginia and North Carolina, snaked from the highlands of East
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Tennessee past Knoxville and Chattanooga down into northern
Alabama and Mississippi before turning northward back through
West Tennessee to join the Ohio River near Paducah, Kentucky.
Unlike the rich metallurgical mecca of the upper Ohio River and
the Great Lakes region, the Tennessee Valley was dependent on
a faltering agricultural base. From the late nineteenth century
to the 1920s and 1930s, the size of farms diminished and the
number of tenant farmers tripled as population growth and
productivity stagnated.10 Thus, for socioeconomic as well as
military reasons, Muscle Shoals seemed an ideal location for the
Section 124 nitrate plant and accompanying hydroelectric dam.
When word of the site’s selection reached northern
Alabama, thousands flocked to the Muscle Shoals/Florence
area, looking for work.11 Frantic construction on the dam and
nitrate plant proceeded as demand for fertilizer and munitions
skyrocketed with the deployment of American forces to the
Western Front in Belgium and France. However, the end of
the war and the return to normalcy ushered in congressional
attempts to rein in wartime spending, including cutting the Muscle
Shoals initiative. By March 1920, fiscal conservatives sank an
appropriations package to continue work on the project, stalling
construction indefinitely.12 The partially-completed facility would
remain dormant while national business and political forces
battled to see who would control the fate of Muscle Shoals and
the Tennessee Valley’s development. On one side, the greatest
industrialist of the country would seek to build a new Detroit on
the Tennessee River. On the other, a mustachioed lawyer from
McCook, Nebraska, would seek to stop him.
THE PROPHET FROM NEBRASKA
They called him a “son of the wild jackass,” a “radical,” a
socialist, and a scourge sent to Washington, D.C. for Nebraska’s
political schadenfreude.13 They also called him the “Fighting
Liberal,” the “pillar of the New Deal,” and “an uncompromising
16
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foe of special privilege.”14 Future President John F. Kennedy
eulogized him in Profiles in Courage (1955). Businessmen damned
his liberal tendencies. Presidents of his own political party vetoed
his bills and presidents of the other political party supported
his reelection. The people of Nebraska chose him to represent
them for forty years. To his admirers, he represented them
and Americans everywhere, and he fought with an unbridled
intensity to defend their democratic rights, to afford them
economic opportunity, and to uplift them out of poverty.15 For
his defiance, his leadership, and his uncompromising empathy,
George W. Norris is remembered as one of the greatest populist
senators in American history.

George W. Norris,
Senator from Nebraska and
Leader of the Progressive Civil Religion
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He was also the legislative champion of a faith, the
progressive civil religion of infrastructure. Acquainted with
the trials of farmers scratching a living out of the Nebraska
prairie and the ruinous consequences of capitalist speculation,
Norris maintained a deep compassion for the rural poor and a
loathing for the capitalist industrialists. His devotion to populist
progressivism bordered on zealotry. On politics and religion,
Norris once wrote, “True love for humanity is an unselfish
desire to perpetuate the welfare and happiness of all the people
comprising the government. I think religion is the same thing.”16
He would attack economic problems with ideological ferocity
throughout his long career on the national stage.
Nebraskans elected Norris to the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1902.17 At first, Norris played a quiet role
in Congress, serving as a dutiful Republican. However, after
five years in the House, his indignation towards the dictatorial
management style of Speaker Joseph Cannon grew and so
did his penchant for legislative rebellion. In his autobiography,
Fighting Liberal (1945), Norris reflected, “I doubt if any Speaker
in the history of Congress was as ruthless as Joe Cannon was.”18
Norris, therefore, decided that it was time to curtail the Speaker’s
power. In May 1908, he challenged Cannon over the BallingerPinchot controversy, diving into a pool of scandal that rocked
the nation.
Specifically, Gifford Pinchot, a favorite of conservationist
progressives and hand-picked by President Theodore Roosevelt
as the Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, came into conflict with
President William Howard Taft’s Secretary of the Interior,
Richard Ballinger. Before leaving office, Roosevelt had announced
that waterpower was for the “public interest” and directed
Pinchot to reserve federal lands for hydroelectric purposes.19
However, this led to a series of escalating, and highly public,
rhetorical brawls between Pinchot and Ballinger once the new
Taft administration had settled in. When this conflict began to
divide Congress, Cannon backed Ballinger and the White House,
18
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who thought that Pinchot’s efforts were a conservationist bridge
too far.20 Conversely, Norris backed the hardline progressive
Pinchot. Eventually, Taft sacked Pinchot in January 1910, but
Norris had led an effective revolt against the Speaker by aligning
the progressives as a united front. The Ballinger-Pinchot
controversy widened the divisions between the progressives, led
by Theodore Roosevelt, and the conservatives, generally aligned
with Taft. Furthermore, the controversy helped to break the
back of Cannon’s stranglehold on the House, giving Norris a
starring role as an insurgent progressive who was willing and able
to challenge the powers of his own political party to advance his
agenda and defend his values. In hindsight, this would not be the
last time that hydropower elicited Norris to revolt.
After his successful transition to the U.S. Senate in the
1912 elections, Norris decided, once again, to buck the GOP
in support of Pinchot. In Pennsylvania’s 1914 U.S. Senate race,
Norris travelled to the state and campaigned for Pinchot against
the sitting Republican, Senator Boies Penrose.21 Interviewed
by The New York Times a few weeks before the election, Norris
remarked, “As a Republican Senator I consider it a duty to my
conscience, to decent citizenship, and populist government to
oppose with all my power the re-election of Penrose.”22 Although
Pinchot failed to defeat Penrose, Norris returned to Washington,
D.C. and began developing his position on natural resources. He
became a vigorous supporter of the Raker Act of 1913 to allow
San Francisco to create a reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley,
and a spirited opponent of the private corporations which
sought to “protect” the Valley from reservoir development so
they could inhibit public control.23
Beyond the sphere of progressive domestic policy,
Norris achieved fame and infamy for his positions on the rising
tensions with Germany. A first-term member of the U.S. Senate,
he garnered harsh criticism for his unyielding opposition to
American involvement in the First World War. For example,
he went on to vote against the declaration of war in April
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1914.24 Additionally, feeling that his ensuing actions incited his
constituents, Norris proposed a special recall election in March
1917 so the people could reassess their support for him after he
torpedoed an armed ship bill in the Senate through a filibuster.25
The state committee denied his request for a recall, sparing him
the public’s wrath. Norris, despite negative prognostications from
journalists and political pundits, fared well in the Republican
primary the next year and secured a victory in the 1918 general
election against Governor John H. Morehead.26
Overall, Norris’ first term in the U.S. Senate was
eventful. His ardor for progressive causes and occasional selfrighteousness were emblematic of the maverick career he would
continue for the next three decades. Senator Norris came to be
a standard-bearer for a distinctly populist, radical progressive
civil religion, a new national faith that placed great confidence in
the government’s ability to solve the ills of mankind. Historian
William Leuchtenburg described the progressive belief structure
as relying on the “Hamiltonian concept of positive government”
where actions were judged by “results achieved” rather than
“means employed.”27 Focusing on American foreign policy,
Leuchtenburg linked progressivism to imperialism. Although he
was certainly a hardline progressive, Norris was no imperialist.
His international viewpoint evoked William Jennings Bryan
rather than Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson.
Norris’ introspective progressive civil religion
foreshadowed the spirit of the 1930s. For him, the United States
could afford little of the burdens of colonial investment when
its own citizens cried out for relief. During his career, he did
not just advocate for progressivism—labor rights, agricultural
aid, and more direct democracy—he lived a progressive life of
action seeking to solve problems through political means. His
eternal focus was on the promotion of the national welfare,
often through his preferred policy bailiwick of agricultural
and infrastructural policies. Cautious of foreign entanglements
and disconnected from the progressive elites of the coasts,
20
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Norris united a robust faith in domestic progressivism with
agrarian populism. Although he had supported Wilson’s liberal
domestic policies, Norris’ strident opposition to the First World
War defined his dichotomous civil religion—staunch domestic
progressivism and national introversion. Fundamentally, Norris
sought the transformation of the regulatory liberal state to an
activist national government. He sought to turn pen strokes into
shovel-ready projects. He felt that the government must do what
private industry did not do—provide for the people. Norris’
determination was unwavering despite consistent political
setbacks, partially the result of his stubbornness. The Classical
Liberal zeitgeist of the 1920s ensured that he was Norris, the
Republican renegade. The progressive revolution of the 1930s,
the New Deal, put him on the front lines to build what he
believed in—the TVA.
FORD VERSUS NORRIS
On July 8, 1921, George W. Norris’ campaign for the TVA
began. With the federal funding drought stunting the Muscle
Shoals project, auto magnate Henry Ford submitted a proposal
to acquire the nitrate plant and dam system through a deal in
which his company would operate the facility. This offer included
a one hundred year “lease on the Wilson Dam, the No. 3 dam
and electric installation, when complete.”28 For southerners, the
Ford proposal appeared ideal. The project would be completed
and Ford would industrialize the Tennessee Valley, supposedly
bringing with him the high-paying manufacturing jobs that had
provided for thousands of families throughout the Midwest.
Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce in President Warren
G. Harding’s administration, voiced his support and admitted
that “whatever may be the result, Mr. Ford’s offer does prove
what the public associations [of the region] have contended, that
the completion of the project has a commercial value.”29 The
offer, however, required congressional action for approval first.
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As the nitrate plant fell within the purview of agricultural
management, the Ford deal bill, S.3420, was sent to the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Its chairman was
Senator George W. Norris. The Ford offer and the Muscle
Shoals issue became the subjects of a lengthy series of hearings
in the Committee throughout 1922. The bill’s consideration was
complicated by the presence of competing business interests
which sought to take Muscle Shoals for themselves. Furthermore,
the ambiguous contractual language in the bill obfuscated
its potential ramifications. This led to a series of complicated
discussions peppered with civil engineering technicalities. Norris,
however, came prepared.
The testimony from the committee hearings on the
bill reveals the strong support from a number of influential
southerners for the proposed deal, especially the Alabama
delegation. It also illustrates Norris’ position on the appropriate
role for private corporations and moneyed interests in the
production of nitrates and, more importantly, electricity.30
Hearings began on February 16, 1922, when a delegation from
Tennessee led by Governor Alf Taylor arrived to testify. Taylor,
highly supportive of the Ford offer, commenced his address to
the Committee with the following statement, in which he cited
renown inventor Thomas Edison:
[Edison] said in my presence that it was impossible to
conceive the immensity of the power that could be
produced by that plant when completed, and that the
benefits to be derived to the country at large were also
inconceivable, and that Henry Ford was the man to take
hold and operate it when it was completed, because he was
an honest man, and a man of splendid judgment, and a
man who had succeeded, and a man who had the money.31
Curiously, Taylor’s speech continued with a broad appeal against
sectionalism and particularism. Perhaps aware of the geographic
22
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diversity of the sixteen committee members and knowing that
the economic benefit of the development would be concentrated
in the northern Alabama area, only relevant to Senators Pat
Harrison (D-MS) and J. Thomas Heflin (D-AL), Taylor adopted
a nationwide tone, remarking that “what is good for one section
of this Union is good for every section.”32 The memories of the
Civil War were still fresh in the minds of many. Taylor understood
that to promote regional infrastructural development, a national
justification had to be made. When Norris attempted to advance
his own legislation, he would take this lesson to heart.
Later that day, the Committee heard from Robert
Campbell, a business organizer from Johnson City, Tennessee.
Attempting to elucidate the motivation for Ford’s interest in
the project and the bill’s ambiguous language concerning the
requirement to actually produce nitrates, the Committee pressed
Mr. Campbell on what he considered to be the industrialist’s
intentions. Campbell, scrambling for answers, stated, “Mr. Ford’s
ambitions can not [sic] any longer demand money. He must
want to…build a monument.”33 Unsatisfied, the Committee
members asked Campbell whether, under the proposed statute,
Ford would be barred from transitioning to a more profitable
industry as profits from fertilizer production were capped at eight
percent. Campbell responded, “I trust Mr. Ford…You have to
trust somebody.”34 Senator John W. Harreld (R-OK), suspicious
of Ford’s motives, noted that the project was not “altruism.”35
Norris, who in June of the previous year had proposed the
creation of a “Federal Farmer’s Export Financing Corporation”
to buy crops from farmers for international resale, agreed with
Harreld’s sentiments.36 It would later become clear that in those
cases where a key national interest was concerned, Norris would
prefer to inject altruism through the government rather than
entrusting a private citizen, such as Henry Ford, to do so instead.
After a brief hiatus, the hearings resumed on April 10,
1922. Once again, the witness, this time Senator Underwood
from Alabama, argued that Ford was pursuing the deal for
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altruistic reasons. Underwood, who had a clear and compelling
interest in facilitating the industrialization of the Muscle Shoals
area through Ford’s proposal, opined with saccharine hyperbole.
After lambasting opponents of the deal, Underwood orated that
“[Ford] is prepared to do a great patriotic act for the people
of the United States by limiting the amount of his profits and
producing fertilizer for them as cheaply as possible.”37
When the President of the Alabama Power Company,
Thomas W. Martin, came to testify on April 11 and April 18,
Chairman Norris asked why Alabama power customers faced
such high prices and massive discrepancies in kilowatt prices.38
Norris noted that “there is something wrong if [Alabama
municipalities] pay you for their electricity less than a cent and
sell it to their people for 12 cents.”39 Martin provided a series of
evasive answers, to which Norris provided the counterexample
of the low prices enjoyed by electricity customers in Ontario,
Canada, where the government ran the power system.40 Ontario
Hydro, which relied on extensive hydroelectric installations
along the Niagara River, would become a model for Norris as he
conducted independent research on the viability of a governmentrun power generation and distribution corporation.41
By May 1, Norris’ patience for Fordists and corporate
envoys was wearing thin. William B. Mayo, Chief Engineer of the
Ford Motor Company, arrived to testify before the Committee.
Norris, unsatisfied with the ambiguity of answers on Ford’s
ultimate intentions for the plant and dams, was concerned that
the industrialist would exploit the contract’s loopholes to dupe
the government.42 After an endless series of inane prevarications
from Mayo, Norris’ tolerance expired and he interjected, “I have
been wondering, Mr. Mayo, why is it that, representing Mr. Ford,
you are not willing to take the committee and the Congress into
your full confidence and let them know just exactly what you
expect to do with this power if you get it.”43 Norris continued
with his critical rhetoric against private, corporate infrastructure
improvements.44 The ongoing testimonials failed to allay his
24

Joseph Kiernan

The Age of Infrastructure

fears that once Henry Ford died, the company would repurpose
the nitrate facility. Questioning the chairman of the Tennessee
River Improvement Association Executive Committee, J.W.
Worthington, Norris expressed his irritation that businessmen
expected the government to grant Ford a carte blanche and trust
that his motives aligned with the public interest. Norris remarked,
“But [Ford] is not the only man in the country that is good,
although he may be one of the best of them.”45
Considering Muscle Shoals a matter of national
importance, Norris sparred with Worthington, alleging that
it was the government’s role to protect the people from Ford.
Worthington shot back at the Chairman, quipping, “The people
of this country don’t want to be saved.”46 With that incendiary
remark, Worthington touched upon a major component of
Norris’ progressive American civil religion. Norris believed that
the people needed protection from the profit-driven capitalist
class, including Henry Ford, who would use any opportunity to
price, gouge, profiteer, or pilfer. To that end, Norris maintained
a conviction that it was the government’s role to intervene or
preempt to safeguard the public welfare. Conservatives would
probably have agreed with Worthington, portraying Norris as
self-righteous. But the exchange with Worthington revealed
the Nebraska Senator’s faith that Norris knew what the people
needed even if they did not, for he knew how to protect them
from the dangers of antidemocratic capitalist elites, and he
knew that government must be the shield. These convictions
undergirded Norris’ political philosophy.
A New York Times article from May 10, 1922, captured
Norris’ opposition to the Ford deal. Norris remarked that he
would permit “no corporation” to take over the Muscle Shoals
properties and felt that the bill included an “unconscionable
contract.”47 Agreeing with a statement from the Merchant’s
Association on a prior Ford offer to the Secretary of War, Norris
believed that a deal with a corporation on Muscle Shoals would
represent a major loss for the government.48 Four days earlier on
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May 6, Norris once again lost his temper in an interaction with
a business representative from the Air Nitrates Corporation.
Expressing similar sentiments to his comments in April, Norris
remarked:
You haven’t any assurance that this corporation will
benefit the people one iota, and you cannot demonstrate
it or show it, and that is where the curse comes in. It
will be just like any other corporation. It will be owned
by somebody else and will be manipulated just the same
as the International Harvester Co. has been manipulated
and is being manipulated right now, and the farmer will
not be helped any.49
With a keen interest in the benefits of hydropower
and cheap fertilizer for American farmers, Norris saw Muscle
Shoals as an opportunity to replenish the ruined soils of the
impoverished Tennessee Valley and to give the people access to
affordable electricity. Residents and business interests in the region
were eager for the government to complete the dam project for
energy generation and navigation purposes. However, the cagy
testimony of the parade of corporate officials and the weakness
of the government position in S.3420 convinced Norris that it
must be Washington, D.C., not Wall Street, to assume leadership
at Muscle Shoals. Therefore, Norris launched his own effort,
proposing a government-controlled corporation.
Throughout the hearings, Norris blamed pro-Ford
propaganda for the strong public support for the bill’s passage.
Norris’ opposition to the Ford proposal earned him many
enemies throughout the South, where he was burned in effigy
for halting development along the Tennessee River.50 Senators
Charles McNary (R-OR) and Norris clashed with their
Democratic colleagues, Alabamians Heflin and Underwood, in
a continuous war of words.51 The tensions did not abate during
the following years. Heflin called Norris’ 1924 Muscle Shoals
26
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bill “Bolshevistic.”52 Residents of the region were furious with
Norris. However, the Teapot Dome Scandal galvanized public
outrage at the apparent collusion of government and private
companies to ravage national natural resources.53 On July 15,
1922, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry rejected
the Ford proposal by a vote of nine to seven.54 The Committee
also halted Norris’ government-controlled proposal by a vote of
nine to five.55 Both proposals later went to the Senate floor as
minority reports.
Throughout the entirety of the Muscle Shoals debate,
Norris couched his arguments and opinions in his progressive
civil religious attitude. Once, he remarked that government was
a “religion that does not consider the conditions which exist
beyond the grave but confines its consideration to happiness in
this life.”56 For Norris, the problem with corporate leadership
in matters of national interest returned to the initial point
established by Senator Harreld: altruism. The Nebraskan
Senator held a deep suspicion of business motives, as shown by
his intense interrogation of corporate witnesses, and believed,
rightfully or not, that any “damn corporation” would exploit the
government and the people in the pursuit of profit, regardless of
the consequences.57
After the hearings and aware of the economic situation
facing the region, Norris envisioned a vanguard role for the
government in the Tennessee Valley. The 1920s would be marked
by his repeated attempts to push his legislative proposals, the
forerunners to the TVA, through Congress and into law. Always
a renegade, Norris would take on the succession of presidents
of his own political party to realize this vision.
THE REPUBLICAN REBEL
In June 1925, George F. Milton, a reporter for The
Independent, described the Tennessee Valley as “the Ruhr of
America,” an allusion to the heartland of German industrial
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strength. However, unlike its German counterpart, the Tennessee
Valley languished in poverty and underdevelopment. Also, unlike
the Ruhr, the Tennessee Valley, which Milton projected to be
“the very heart of industrial America,” still had not resolved the
political impediments to its economic salvation. The Wilson Dam
in Muscle Shoals was completed that year, but the hydroelectric,
fertilizer, and progressive (Norris) interests had opposing views
on what to do with its electricity.58 As Milton attests, the people
understood that “the Tennessee River is rightly a national
institution,” and Norris thought that national institutions should
be controlled by their owners, the citizens of the United States.59
Throughout the 1920s, Norris waged a successful
legislative war of attrition against conservative adversaries to gain
public control of Muscle Shoals. Not only did Norris fight for a
comprehensive, government-led effort, but he also campaigned
to derail Senator Underwood’s attempts to pass legislation
that merely focused on fertilizer production. Furthermore, in
December 1924, Norris denounced President Calvin Coolidge’s
alleged attempt to cede Muscle Shoals to the “water power trust.”
He argued that the President’s intent was to deliver to Wall Street
“a concession so great that it will make Teapot Dome [Scandal]
look like a pinhead.”60 In doing so though, Norris’ attacks
spawned strange political bedfellows as Underwood the Southern
Democrat allied with Coolidge the Massachusetts Republican
against Norris the progressive Nebraska Republican.61 For
Norris, party loyalty meant nothing compared to the national
imperative of economic development at Muscle Shoals. Also,
to Coolidge’s chagrin, Norris had backed independent Robert
“Fighting Bob” La Follette Sr. over Coolidge in the presidential
election of 1924, which surely did not endear the Senator to the
new President.62 Underwood subsequently defended Coolidge
and branded Norris as a “Populist” demagogue.63 Although they
were defeated, Coolidge and Underwood would exact vengeance
when Norris’ own proposals reached the Senate floor soon
afterward.
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Norris introduced a proto-TVA bill, S.J. Res. 2147, in
January 1926, but it died in committee. However, in December
1927, Norris’ succeeding bill, S.J. Res. 46 or the “Morin-Norris
resolution,” which provided “for the completion of Dam. No.
2 at Muscle Shoals and the steam plant at Nitrate Plant No. 2,”
was passed by Congress. In a scathing attack, The Washington Post
labeled the Morin-Norris bill as “communism, pure and simple”
and “essentially un-American.”64 Unsurprisingly, Coolidge
exercised a pocket veto to kill the legislation in June 1928.65 In
response, Norris launched a furious assault against Coolidge,
threatening to break up the Republican Party and organize a
third-party Farmer-Progressive ticket to challenge the Republican
establishment in the year’s general election.66 This proved the
depth of Norris’ devotion to pro-farmer, progressive policies.
Not only did he animadvert the President as a stooge of the
“power trust,” but he also discussed a full-scale rebellion against
his own political party’s administration and the party leadership
itself. Were Norris a marginalized radical, these actions may have
seemed less unusual. However, he enjoyed respect and legislative
support throughout Congress, which made his defiance all the
more exceptional. For Norris, the call of his civil faith was too
strong to bow to Coolidge, or to any non-progressive president.
In 1928, Norris broke party ranks again and endorsed
New York Democratic Governor Al Smith for the presidency.67
Although Smith’s “wet,” Catholic background proved unpopular
with Nebraskans, Norris believed that the Governor’s
compassion for the common people warranted his support over
the free marketeering Republican challenger, Secretary Herbert
Hoover. However, Hoover’s victory ensured another unfriendly
conservative White House for Norris. With the new president
assuming office in May 1929 though, Norris tried to gain support
for his government-control effort again with a new legislative
bill, S.J. Res. 49. Indeed, the people of the Tennessee Valley
had grown tired of the government’s vacillation on the Muscle
Shoals project. As Congress turned the dam and nitrate system
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into a political football, the farmers and businessmen of the
region wished for some form of action. Even the “communist”
government-operated proposal floated by Norris, therefore, was
gaining traction.
Reporting on the situation in the Deep South from
Florence, Alabama, journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote,
“Inoculation against the idea of ‘government in business’ goes
far and deep, particularly in regions like [the Tennessee Valley],
where government does not fulfill even the humblest citizen’s
ideal of efficiency or honesty.”68 As the woe of the Great
Depression deepened, the people of the Tennessee Valley looked
to Washington, D.C. for a “second reconstruction.” Recording
the local reaction to the new legislation, McCormick observed,
“A few days after the second passage of the Norris resolution
declaring that Muscle Shoals shall be owned and operated by
the government, the valley is once more stirred by the hope
of action as by a fresh wind from the north.”69 With broad
legislative support, Norris’ bill passed Congress and headed
down Pennsylvania Avenue to Hoover’s desk.70
Like his Republican predecessor, President Hoover,
standing adamant against federal control, vetoed the bill. The
President commented that opposition to Norris’ agenda
“appears to be cause for denunciation as being in league with
the power companies.”71 A few days prior, Norris had alleged
that the power trust sought to manipulate the U.S. government
and appropriate her resources, hinting that Hoover was caught
in its corporate enchantment. Lambasting the utilities, Norris
stated, “What is the raw material of this monopoly? It is the
rivers and the brooks that flow from the mountains to the sea.
Is it not true that the people own these natural resources?”72
Not only did Norris believe that the power trust exerted undue
monopolistic influence, but he also felt that it could coerce the
media to do its bidding. When asked for a comparative example
of a private versus public system, Norris usually referred to
the Canadian public versus American private prices along the
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Niagara River. However, analyzing Ontario Hydro, journalist
Thomas Woodlock of The Wall Street Journal excoriated publicoperated power in a November 1930 article alleging that private
plants were more economical than public ones.73 The ferocity
of journalistic opposition to government-led Tennessee Valley
proposals tended to lend some credence to the Senator’s
statements that corporate power interests were colluding with
the media to halt public expansions.
Hoover’s veto infuriated Southern Democrats and
Midwestern Progressives who stood against the pro-Hoover
Northeastern Republicans. The Senate attempted an override,
but fell six votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to
do so with forty-nine votes for and thirty-four votes against.74
Authoring a long, detailed explanation for his veto, Hoover
suggested that Alabama and Tennessee could collaborate to
develop the Tennessee Valley. He did, however, voice support for
the construction of the Cove Creek (later Norris) Dam on the
Clinch River for flood regulation.75 Hoover felt that he needed

Construction of Cove Creek Dam, later renamed Norris Dam
in honor of Senator George W. Norris
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to delineate between the appropriate realms of government and
private operations. In his justification, the President remarked,
“I hesitate to contemplate the future of our institutions, of our
government and of our country if the preoccupation of its
officials is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal
opportunity, but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That
is not liberalism, it is degeneration.”76
Though businessmen and conservatives viewed Norris’
Muscle Shoals proposals as “degeneration,” the winds of political
change were blowing across the United States. The serious
economic crisis was plunging millions into poverty. In particular,
the rural poor faced the brunt of the Great Depression, a
calamity widely pinned to the excessive greed and speculation
of Wall Street financiers. As demands for government assistance
increased, allegations of socialistic planning decreased.
Furthermore, the need for basic necessities, which increasingly
included the provision of electricity, aligned with the progressive
ethos that in matters of national interest, the moral imperative
of the ends justified the unilateralism of the means. Seeing it
as a modern necessity, Norris viewed electricity as “the breath
of life of the machine age” and “essential to human activity.”77
Economic Liberals such as Hoover, Coolidge, and later, Wendell
Willkie saw electric power as a force of progress, granted to
the country through the vibrancy of American capitalism and
competition. Norris saw power as tantamount to a civil right.
PROGRESSIVISM EMPOWERED
Fresh off his victory over President Herbert Hoover in
the presidential election of 1932, President-Elect Franklin D.
Roosevelt travelled to Alabama in January 1933 to tour Muscle
Shoals. He delivered an informal speech on January 21 in
Montgomery to a crowd that included the Governor of Alabama.
Roosevelt fused reverence for Alabama’s past with his progressive
vision for the country. His message was clear. Standing in the
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“birthplace of the Confederacy,” Roosevelt outlined a bold
future for the stagnating, suffering South, painting a future of
“better opportunities and better places for living for millions” of
people through “planning.”78
As President Roosevelt prepared to deliver a furious
volley of ambitious New Deal legislation in the spring of 1933
after his inauguration, Norris worked to bring his dream to
fruition. Collaborating with Representative Lister Hill (D-AL) in
the House of Representatives, Norris developed S.J. 1272, known
as the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933. According to S.J.
1272, the TVA was to be governed by a board of commissioners
selected by presidential appointment. In addition to ordering the
operation of experimental plants and laboratories for fertilizer
production, the bill authorized the TVA to “produce, distribute,
and sell electric power.”79 A New York Times article on the bill
captured the novelty and revolutionary nature of the TVA
proposal:
The 1933 edition of the Norris bill for the development
of Muscle Shoals follows the original model, with the
[TVA] tacked on. Cheap fertilizer for the farmer, cheap
light and power for the housewife. They are to be sought
by putting government, directly, into the fertilizer and
utility business, on almost a cosmic scale. The power
plants are to be made a weapon in the war on the ‘Power
Trust.’80
Norris, who had faced recalcitrant Republican opposition
during the 1920s, only received support from Roosevelt, whom
Norris had supported in the presidential election of 1932. In
April and May 1933, President Roosevelt worked to speed the
TVA bill to passage.81 In a speech to Congress, Roosevelt spoke
in the language of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure,
calling for the “return to the spirit and vision of the pioneer”
through government “planning.” He preached that it was time
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for the United States to create “a corporation clothed with the
power of Government…for the general social and economic
welfare of the Nation.”82 Where there was no hope, government
would provide. Where there was no altruism, government would
provide. The message from Roosevelt to an audience of millions
of unemployed workers and tenant farmers, therefore, evoked
the message that the government was there and ready to provide
for and safeguard its constituents.
On May 4, 1933, the TVA bill passed for the seventh
and final time with a massive congressional majority. The House
versions were less aggressive than Norris’ proposal, giving more
room for government partnerships with private firms. The
Nebraskan’s bill envisioned a TVA vertically integrated to master
the river, derive electricity from dams, and then electrify the
countryside. As usual, Norris garnered more Democratic than
Republican support for his agenda.83 His image transformed as he
brought his legislative power to bear for the President. Roosevelt
needed a torchbearer in the Senate and Norris was a true believer
in the New Deal. For Norris, the Roosevelt revolution was an
opportunity to restore the power of the people and democratize
the progress that conservatives and big businesses thought must
come from free enterprise. The TVA was a landmark change.
While progressives had sought to regulate corporate greed and
bust trusts for decades, progressive government would now
replace business in the pursuit of national progress. Thus, Norris
the “son of the wild jackass” was now Norris the New Dealer.84
Not all citizens and politicians shared the President’s
enthusiasm for the TVA or for the unprecedented breadth
of Norris’ proposal. An article in The New York Times from
April 1933 warned that the TVA should seek to develop the
region in conjunction with existing private utilities. Concerned
Norris’ proposal was too radical, the article suggested that the
House versions provided a more reasonable compromise and
consideration of the various interests with stakes in the Tennessee
Valley business:
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If the Government is to embark on this venture at all, it
is earnestly to be hoped that these saving clauses [from
the House] will be retained in the bill, and an opportunity
thus afforded the new Tennessee Valley Authority to
work out its grandiose plans in cooperation with the
utilities, rather than in cutthroat competition with them.85
Despite the article’s hope for “cooperation,” however,
the relationship between the TVA and the private utilities would
be defined by “cutthroat competition.” In fact, the seriousness of
the competition dragged the TVA’s attention from dam-building
to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the TVA’s mandate expanded,
either through statute, precedent, or unilateral decisionmaking, the private utilities’ propensity and ability to cooperate
diminished, souring and hardening into indignant animosity.
Fighting the full force of the Roosevelt administration would
prove a herculean feat, but as soon as the TVA started to act,
opposition coalesced. Nevertheless, on June 16, 1933, less than
a month after President Roosevelt signed the compromise bill,
the Tennessee Valley Authority initiated operations. The federal
government was officially in the power business.86
THE TRIUMPH OF THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Norris’ crusade to create the TVA was the signature
campaign of the progressive civil religion of the 1930s.
Distrustful of corporations, skeptical of state cooperation,
and concerned for many of the impoverished farmers of
rural Tennessee and Alabama, the Nebraska Senator laced his
statements and speeches with the language of progressivism. It
was the faith of the Age of Infrastructure. No longer content
to check the excesses and injustices of the free market, Norris
and his colleagues let government lead the way through planning.
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The spirit of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure went
beyond the legislative birth of the TVA and Norris’ determined
efforts—it permeated the form and function of the TVA as it
reengineered southern Appalachia.
President Roosevelt appointed a three-man Board of
Directors—David Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan, and Harcourt
Morgan—to manage the TVA and oversee its ambitious agenda.
The TVA’s plans for the region were bold. By the fall of 1944,
nine main river dams were completed and generated electricity
along the course of the Tennessee River from Fort Loudoun
Dam to Kentucky Dam, 628 miles downstream. Incorporating
the two existing dams on the Tennessee River, Wilson and Hales
Bar, the TVA built the remainder of the main river dams as well
as a number of fossil fuel power plants, a plethora of bridges,
and numerous smaller electricity-generating and storage dams
along the river’s tributaries.87 The TVA tamed the river through
the creation of massive reservoirs covering thousands of acres
and enabled navigation from Knoxville to the Gulf of Mexico.88
Norris Dam, renamed in honor of the Senator, dammed the
Clinch River, a tributary of the Tennessee River northeast of
Knoxville. Formerly known as the Cove Creek Dam, the Norris
Dam was the first line of defense against damaging floods which
devastated the Tennessee Valley, the Ohio Valley, and down to
the Mississippi River. Apart from local destruction, frequent
flooding degraded the already-depleted soil of the Tennessee
Valley.
Part of the TVA’s Norris Dam project included the
construction of a local settlement, also called Norris. The village,
a master-planned community, included communal amenities and
modern conveniences. Unlike many works camps of the Great
Depression, Norris was designed as a permanent community—the
TVA’s model community.89 Even religious life was reformulated
as a modern, ecumenical civil exercise. For example, the secular
public school was the designated place of worship for the
inhabitants of the village. While the village’s small size and rural
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milieu influenced the lack of appropriate facilities, the image of
a unified community engaging in a religious exercise fell in-line
with the vision of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure.
Individual impediments to unity were to be overcome. Every
prayer was a civil communion, and every concrete pour was
alms for a needy nation. This civil ecumenicalism produced
strident critics in the 1930s South. For example, responding
to TVA regulations on church construction, a local southern
governor admitted that he did not appreciate Norris’ progressive
ecumenicalism, identifying such practices with “communism.”90
But the TVA did not build a “godless town” in Norris, Tennessee;
it built a new universal devotion—the religion of communitarian
progress in which all citizens could share material salvation on
Earth. In his autobiography, Senator Norris admitted, “religious
prejudice is the most deeply imbued prejudice that exists in
the human heart.”91 Thus, the TVA brought the totality of life
within the public sphere, engineering egalitarianism through the
progressive civil religion of infrastructure.
Much of the TVA’s physical infrastructure also embodied
the progressive civil religious ideals of a perfectible society. To
link Knoxville to the dam and the village, the TVA built a parkway
praised by national critics for its fusion of natural beauty with
functionality.92 Under the TVA, a public work was more than a
mere concrete highway or a hydroelectric dam. Aesthetic quality
and permanence were key features, designed to maximize the
experience and welfare of the people. In every dam’s control
room, the words “Built for the People of the United States”
were emblazoned in steely letters for all to see. Progressives
of the past had sought to cordon off expanses of American
wilderness from negative human interference—conserving
in the face of capitalist progress. Progressives of the Age of
Infrastructure, however, sought to modify the world to suit their
design for the people—engineering the alternative to capitalist
progress. The architectural style of the dams and other TVA
facilities epitomized the forceful modernity that accompanied
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this governing philosophy. A mixture of brutalism, elegance,
and industrial might defined the TVA dams along the Tennessee
River and its tributaries. Art deco motifs graced turbine halls and
bold lines defined the concrete hulks slicing into the verdant hills
of East Tennessee.
The TVA’s quantitative contributions were as impressive
as its buildings. By 1938, the TVA employed 13,000 men and
women.93 By 1941, before the completion of the last several dams,
the TVA had 2,000,000 kilowatts of capacity and it had carved
out a 650-mile navigation channel along the sinuous Tennessee
River. Scholars estimated that by the end of 1943, nearly $722
million government dollars had been invested in navigation,
flood control, and power projects for the TVA, amounting to
an enormous sum. Millions of southerners drew cheap power
from the TVA grid through municipal and community local
distributors. Thousands more enjoyed the parks, lakes, and
recreational facilities built by the TVA along the winding course
of the river.94 The TVA was more than a development agency. It
became the engine for the “arsenal of democracy.”
At one point during the Second World War, the TVA
employed 42,000 workers. Its dams provided the energy for
aluminum production, vital for the United States’ air forces.
It also supplied power to a mysterious government project at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Manhattan Project engineers
harnessed the TVA’s vast electrical resources to enrich uranium
for the United States’ first atomic weapons.95 The United States
government used its investment in the TVA, along with its
hydroelectric projects along the Columbia River in the Pacific
Northwest, to beat ploughshares into swords and defeat fascism.
Writing in 1958, author John Kyle reflected on the successes
of the TVA’s new society. Describing its developmental
achievements and international fame, Kyle explained, “To many
people the world over, the Tennessee Valley Authority represents
the highest achievement of American democracy.”96

38

Joseph Kiernan

The Age of Infrastructure

Propoganda Poster from the Second World War
Flaunting the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Tennessee Valley Authority
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN TURMOIL
The TVA’s flurry of construction did not sate Norris’
appetite for progressive development. He set his sights on
larger quarry: the Mississippi River Valley. In December 1935,
Norris, extrapolating from a former plan for a “Missouri Valley
Authority,” sought to cover half the country under the aegis of
a gargantuan government corporation.97 By 1937, his dreams
were even more expansive. Delivering a statement at the White
House Executive Office, Norris declared that “he was planning
to introduce a bill authorizing creation of an agency to build
throughout the country a system of flood control and power
plants similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.”98 Unfortunately
for Senator Norris though, his bill and his dream of a national
TVA-esque agency died in the Senate.99 Still, this disappointment
would prove the least of his worries. The enemies of the
progressive civil religion of infrastructure were coalescing.
Throughout the 1930s, private system after private system
sold out to the local municipalities and to the TVA—for example,
Tennessee Public Service Co., Tennessee Light & Power Co., West
Tennessee Power & Light Co., and Tennessee Electric Power Co.
all sold off operations to the TVA.100 While these acquisitions
expanded the TVA’s ability to reach underserved populations,
its imperious behavior provoked intense backlash from utility
companies. The adoption of the TVA model in other states was
also faltering. Plans for a New York TVA-esque agency along the
St. Lawrence River were derailed by inadequate funding measures
and lack of congressional support.101 Meanwhile, Norris’ former
secretary and Comptroller General J.R. McCarl had “sharply
questioned some of [the] TVA’s purchasing methods.” On the
defensive, therefore, the Nebraska Senator played his favorite
political card by accusing McCarl of allegiances to the “powertrust.”102
Norris, responding to these problems and other constant
challenges to the TVA’s rather limited statutory authority,
40

Joseph Kiernan

The Age of Infrastructure

proposed a bill to grant the TVA the explicit prerogative to
“buy up private power facilities for resale to communities
wanting a public power source.”103 His legislation also sought to
double the TVA’s bond issuing capacity.104 The TVA leadership
attempted to secure this statutory authorization for an expansion
to TVA powers in the spring of 1935. But, to its frustration,
the TVA Board found the House Military Affairs Committee,
the committee overseeing the TVA, to be less than compliant
with their wishes. The Committee tabled the House version of
Norris’ bill, supported by original TVA sponsor and committee
chairman John Jackson McSwain (D-SC).105
As the dams rose on the Tennessee River, the nation’s
attention and criticism turned to the TVA. In 1936, however,
120,000 high school debate students answered the question:
“Resolved, that all electric utilities should be governmentally
owned.” Herbert Corey, the journalist covering the event, made
no secret of his position on that matter, although he wrapped his
bias in a thin veil of manufactured impartiality: “public ownership
as a policy has failed in the Americas. It might be a necessity in the
backward European countries where the people have lacked the
intelligence and the enterprise on which industrial advancement
is based.”106 The rampant bias on both sides of the TVA issue
reflected how deeply ingrained the public versus private power
ownership issue was in the American political consciousness of
the 1930s.
Businessmen involved in the coal business were also
concerned by the TVA’s activities. Senator Norris, unreserved
in his criticism of capitalist complaints, unleashed his usual
indictments that businessmen were interfering in the national
pilgrimage to public power. During the original struggle for
the TVA’s passage, John L. Lewis, a coal executive, became one
of Norris’ targets. The Senator alleged, “Mr. Lewis’ attitude
simply demonstrated that any man who stands in the way of
human progress and seeks to prevent the use of technological
improvements is standing in his own way and blocking his
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own progress.” Norris did not elaborate on who was granted
the power to define “human progress.” Throughout the Age
of Infrastructure, Norris and his compatriots were completely
convinced that their opinions were irreproachably correct and
moral. Then, they married this unwavering confidence with
technocratic implementation. Victory, not compromise, was
the goal. Understandably, this recalcitrant orthodoxy generated
problems. The opposition to the TVA was not limited to errant
journalists soapboxing through public interest pieces or corporate
representatives. A serious and determined resistance to the TVA’s
encroachment emerged. Nevertheless, one of the TVA’s greatest
challenges was endogenous. Something was rotten in Knoxville.
The TVA’s triumvirate leadership began to disintegrate.
The problems had begun shortly after the foundation of the
TVA in 1933, though it took several years for the severity of
the dissention to permeate the public sphere. Chairman Arthur
Morgan clashed with his fellow board members David Lilienthal
and Harcourt Morgan over significant executive decisions.
What had been a private struggle, especially between Chairman
Morgan and Lilienthal, devolved into a public rhetorical brawl
when Chairman Morgan levied indictments of mismanagement
and negligence against Lilienthal. For example, Chairman
Morgan accused Lilienthal of mishandling the negotiations with
Alcoa over the Fontana Dam in North Carolina. Still, this was
only one case in a succession of outlandish accusations in which
Chairman Morgan publically directed towards Lilienthal. After
the Chairman interfered unreasonably in another spat known as
the Berry marble issue, Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan wrote
to President Roosevelt requesting that Arthur Morgan resign.107
However, Roosevelt, the only significant check on the Chairman’s
power, did nothing.
Eventually, Arthur Morgan forced the President’s
hand. After demanding a congressional investigation into the
activities of the other board members and suspicious TVA
actions, Roosevelt sacked Chairman Morgan in March 1938.
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The defamation continued during the subsequent investigation.
Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan alleged that Arthur Morgan had
tried to “sabotage” the TVA as an agent of the power trust.108
Arthur Morgan shot back, making a series of charges including
“mismanagement of the power program, conspiracy, and
subservience to…special interests.”109 Throughout the summer
of 1938, Lilienthal parried attacks from Arthur Morgan and the
press, referring to the Chairman as “reckless, unreliable, and
erratic.”110
The “TVA Scandal” wrought havoc, distracting from
the completion of TVA priorities and fueling the agency’s
critics. Arthur Morgan launched a messy lawsuit only to be
defeated in the courts, further sullying his already-tainted image.
Although the scandal abated, the series of events tarnished the
TVA’s administrative record. Confidence in the governance of
appointed experts, thought to be immune to the petty politicking
of Congress and the underhanded tactics of the business elites,
was shaken. The Morgan crisis reminded Norris and the radical
New Dealers of an unpleasant reality. Many men, not just Henry
Ford, were driven by avarice and a lust for the aggregation of
power. Business, especially in the unregulated 1920s, was bluntly
motivated by profit, much to Norris’ disgust. However, despite
what Norris would have liked to have thought, government
was no monolith of unending altruism. It, like business, was
composed of men who sought to exercise a vision and the means
to power.
The strife between Arthur Morgan and his two comrades
illustrated how personal and petty concerns could derail the
holy project of the TVA. As the agency made great strides in
raising dams along the rivers and stringing transmission lines
along country roads, the TVA was bogged down in politics
and hearings, eventually necessitating intervention from the
President. Norris had handed the Board an immense amount
of institutional power backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States. The Morgan crisis proved that although the TVA
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could reshape the countryside to suit man’s desires, it could
not, even with its noble mandate, reshape those desires. It also
demonstrated that the TVA, with its unusually long nine-year
appointments for Board members, was as corruptible as any
other government institution.
WENDELL WILLKIE’S WAR
Chairman Arthur Morgan, though troublesome, was not
the greatest foe the TVA faced during the 1930s. The TVA’s rapid
expansion had generated enemies, and the power utilities grew
increasingly concerned, especially as Norris proposed ever-bolder
plans for a nationwide TVA-esque agency that would replace
private power corporations. Throughout its early years, the TVA
interacted with Commonwealth & Southern Corporation (C&S),
a major U.S. utility holding company, and its dynamic, articulate
president, Wendell Willkie. Concerned by government’s entry
into the electricity market, Willkie proved more than a match for
Lilienthal in Knoxville and Norris in Washington, D.C. as they
fought over the future of energy in the United States. Willkie
challenged the fullest expression of the progressive civil religion
of infrastructure, seeking to check the excesses of the New Deal
to preserve the competitive system that he and others felt was
so central to the United States’ economic success and culture of
individual liberty.
In modern times, Wendell Willkie is best remembered
as the Republican challenger to Roosevelt in the presidential
election of 1940. That election was notable because Roosevelt
broke with the Washingtonian tradition and marched towards an
unprecedented third term in office with a healthy lead in votes.
However, Willkie was no stooge of the Republican establishment,
nor was he a conservative purist. He was a dynamic, eloquent
candidate and the most potent foe of the TVA. Willkie was no
politician either; he was hardly even a Republican, having been a
Democrat until 1939. He was a business executive, trained as an
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Wendell Willkie,
President of Commonwealth
& Southern Corporation

attorney, and eminently successful at his work. Promoted from
counsel to president of the influential C&S in 1933, Willkie was
positioned to take control of the company just as the TVA began
organizing. More specifically, Willkie assumed authority when
the TVA was poised to develop electricity systems in a region
where the C&S already had a significant subsidiary presence.
Ironically, Willkie, a registered Democrat at the time
and a regular attendee of national party conventions, became
the champion of the anti-TVA movement. He stood against a
Republican, Senator Norris, who stridently backed every New
Deal proposal and fought for the TVA on every occasion.111
Norris’ progressive faith, which previously had confounded
partisanship, and Willkie’s defense of economic liberty, made for
strange alliances. Over the course of the 1930s, Willkie would
force Norris to shield the TVA, at the public podium and in
the Capitol. The Nebraskan had fought for more than decade
to tame the Tennessee River for the people of the United States.
Now, he would have to fight to keep it.
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The TVA entered negotiations with C&S in 1933 to
discuss a modus vivendi. In January 1934, C&S and the TVA reached
a settlement in which the TVA agreed not to enter certain areas
nor take C&S customers until a few months after the completion
of the Norris Dam. Much to the consternation of C&S, the TVA
immediately sped up construction of the dam. Meanwhile, the
TVA also strung transmission lines around cities currently served
by utility companies and offered economic incentives for those
municipalities to switch service to TVA power.112 Willkie strongly
opposed the double standards which he felt were applied to the
TVA. He argued that if the TVA was subjected to the same
“requirements binding private utilities,” it could not survive
in the marketplace. Beyond general complaints of unfairness,
Willkie’s primary concern was the TVA’s creeping mandate.
Congress tried to set limits on the scope of its powers in the
1935 bills through amendments in the appropriations package.
However, the New Deal legislators had intervened, stripping
out provisions that would have required audits, prohibited the
sale of surplus power under cost, and prevented the duplication
of transmission lines.113 Willkie, therefore, delivered a forceful
condemnation of this interference.114
In 1935, Willkie railed against the TVA “yardstick”
concept, a means to test the fairness of electricity rates, and other
TVA “frantic activity” that he viewed as designed to erode private
utilities through unfair practices.115 President Roosevelt had first
invoked the “yardstick” concept during his campaign in the
presidential election of 1932 as a means through which the TVA
could check the ability of private operators to raise prices, similar
to the discussions on rates that were seen in the Muscle Shoals
hearings in 1922.116 Indeed, the “yardstick” concept was not
included in the original TVA legislation, which troubled Willkie
and other private operators. They felt that the TVA, afforded
government advantages, would be a privileged competitor that
would gradually encroach on their businesses. This was a correct
assumption. Additionally, Willkie assumed that the trend of
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subsidizing consumers “at the expense of taxpayers” through
government intervention would, if not restrained, threaten the
entirety of the U.S. utility market.117 Furthermore, many private
operators believed that the “yardstick” concept was less of a
means of protecting consumers and more of a ploy to bludgeon
control of power systems into government hands. To be sure,
Roosevelt admitted in 1934 that “where the private interest and
this public interest conflict, the public interest must prevail.”118
Electric power had become the cynosure of debate over the
TVA.
Corporate apprehensions about the growth of the
TVA’s mandate and intentions were substantiated by the
difference between the focus of the authorizing legislation—the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933—which provided for
the precedent-supported government regulation of rivers for
navigation and flood control, and the apparent driving focus
of the TVA, supplanting private power utilities. Electric power
generation and transmission had been secondary elements of
an April 1933 Senate Committee report for the TVA bill. The
clear intention of the bill was for flood control and navigation
in the Tennessee Valley as well as the production of fertilizers at
Muscle Shoals. In fact, the report only mentions electric power in
Clause Five.119 When one reflects upon the original intent of the
National Defense Act of 1916, the scope of the transformation
is even broader. Muscle Shoals began as an effort to produce
critical nitrate for U.S. farmers and for the war effort during the
First World War. The electric power was a means to produce
that nitrate. By 1933, however, the project had evolved into a
federal power scheme. This exercise of federal prerogative was
supported with little if any precedent.
Willkie blamed overzealous New Dealers for the TVA’s
alleged overreaching. He released a statement in January 1938
alleging that the TVA was as much an effort to neuter the
private utility industry as it was to build infrastructure for the
impoverished people of the Tennessee Valley:
Penn History Review

47

The Age of Infrastructure

There was no utility problem in the Tennessee Valley
until the Federal Government created it. As soon as
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was passed in June
1933, however, the Federal Government began to flood
the Tennessee Valley with both money and propaganda
on behalf of the government power projects. The
government built dams, power plants, and transmission
lines.120
Willkie, hoping to reach a workable arrangement with the TVA
that protected the core interests of C&S, had been willing to
negotiate with Lilienthal in the early days of TVA activities. As
political scientist C. Herman Pritchett notes, “Several times during
this period[,] Willkie, president of Commonwealth & Southern,
met with Lilienthal, power director of the T.V.A., and presented
suggestions for a division of areas between the two agencies.”121
However, Lilienthal was unwilling to negotiate, believing that the
accommodation of the private power interests was “contrary
to the provisions of the T.V.A. statute.”122 Whether demanding
hard territorial limits on TVA activities from Roosevelt,
litigating against the TVA over competition issues, or speaking
to the American people with “a fluency and eloquence,” Willkie
defended the principles of American free enterprise against
the power of the popular progressive civil religion.123 Willkie’s
national prominence opened his path to challenge Roosevelt
in the presidential election of 1940, by which time he finally
changed his registration to Republican.
Willkie’s war and the TVA’s internal challenges tempered
the scope of Norris’ ambitions for government-operated
utilities. Willkie reminded the American people that while
the government could advance the public good, it could also
advance it beyond appropriate, constitutional boundaries. The
political intransigence of the Muscle Shoals project in the 1920s
suffocated development in the Tennessee Valley. For the farmers
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of Alabama and Tennessee, Congress moved too slowly. The
TVA marched forward at a breakneck pace, erecting dams and
electrifying counties. For some, the TVA was moving too quickly
and without consideration for the consequences of its actions.
Some critics of Norris’ proposals had warned of
creeping socialism or bureaucratic planners run amok. Vehement
opposition to government operations in the Tennessee Valley
only served to prove the progressives’ point—the profit motive
had corrupted every echelon of society. Willkie’s strategic
criticisms and trust-building efforts were far more constructive.
He served as a necessary and natural check on the TVA. When
it erred, Willkie pointed it out. When it ran roughshod over
business interests, he illuminated the transgressions and offered
proposals. Willkie tempered the excesses of the progressive civil
religion of infrastructure. His efforts established a tenable middle
ground between Norris’ dreams of the total nationalization of
utilities and the laissez-faire economics that epitomized the
former Coolidge administration. Through that mediation, the
nation achieved a workable coexistence between governmentled progress and individual-led progress. The TVA stands as a
unique institution in the United States. Norris failed to realize his
dream of public power nationwide. However, the TVA survived
the 1930s, remaining as a robust experiment that provided cheap
power and good jobs to the people of the Tennessee Valley.
THE AGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE
The Age of Infrastructure witnessed some of the
greatest public achievements in the United States. The TVA
brought power to the people, bringing a vision of hope to one
of the country’s poorest regions. It proved that government
would not forget the most vulnerable Americans. Its successes
represented the epitome of Norris’ populist progressivism—
government, as a vanguard, would build a better society through
the provision of economic empowerment. The TVA was a
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national effort, transcending the sectionalism of pettier politics.
Its foremost advocates included a plutocratic president from the
Hudson River Valley and an agrarian populist senator from the
Great Plains. For Norris, the United States was at its best when
it led by example. This informed his isolationist tendencies and
his commitment to communitarian modernism. Writing in 1944,
Norris expressed a hope for a brave, new future of American
politics:
But so long as an unselfish leadership remains for [the
American people’s] guidance—a leadership untainted
by corrupting personal ambition—a leadership inspired
by the simple strength that oozes from the soil and the
humble ranks of the poor—and at time is enriched
and fortified enormously by the support and voice of
those who wear purple robes of great wealth—I am
sure America can continue to be the bright beacon
toward which the eyes of the world’s oppressed and
downtrodden will turn for inspiration and hope.124
The greatest tragedy of Norris’ career was the dearth of
Americans who could provide the “unselfish leadership” he
desired. The destructive squabbling of the TVA triumvirs proved
that even the people’s technocracy was susceptible to the baser
demons of human nature.
The TVA’s troubles paled compared to exploitations
of progressivism by men of truly unbridled “personal
ambition.” For them, the ends always justified the means and
the Age of Infrastructure created unparalleled methods for the
materialization of their vision. Under a banner of social reform
and modernity, city planner Robert Moses, another great builder
of public works, obtained unprecedented and unchecked power
in New York. As he built an administrative empire, he cultivated
and greedily protected his autonomous authority from any
encroachment. Exploiting the ascendancy of public investment
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in infrastructure and justifying his actions under the broad
umbrella of societal progress, Moses bludgeoned any opponent
who sought, like Norris’ Willkie, to moderate his activities. With
imperious arrogance, Moses once remarked, “There are people
who like things as they are…They cannot be permitted to stand
in the way of progress.”125 As he flattened poor and minority
neighborhoods to build titanic highways, Moses meant this
statement in its most literal sense. Either the people would move
or he would move them.
The TVA’s failings and Robert Moses’ autocracy
revealed the dangers inherent to the progressive civil religion of
infrastructure.126 Intention, regardless of its moral rationalization,
did not guarantee purely altruistic governance. The overarching
theme of this political faith was a profound confidence, bordering
on arrogance, that the progressive powerbrokers knew what
was best for the people. Unwavering faith in the righteousness
of one’s opinions translated into wholesale, uncompromising
implementation and a flawed belief that one could reengineer
society to conform to their idea of a democratic utopia.
Institutions of merit without checks became the realms of the
bureaucratic oligarchy.
In forming the model of the United States’ constitutional
representative republic, James Madison recognized that
government would need to check private ambitions for the
safety of the body politic. Progressives, including Woodrow
Wilson, thought this cautious conservative form of government
obsolete for the modern age. Norris did worry about the
ambitions of men such as Henry Ford or the “power trusters,”
but he equated the threat with unbridled industrial capitalism,
not an overzealous government. Norris failed to recognize how
his own works, however well-intentioned, created new, and often
thoroughly undemocratic, avenues for the individual pursuit of
power at the public’s expense. Sadly for this “gentle knight of
American democracy,” his endless compassion for the plight of
the poor was tainted by his own naïveté.127
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Despite these setbacks, Norris’ contributions to building
American democracy were monumental. During the 1920s, his
national perspective and resolute integrity reinforced the people’s
faith in their government in an era of regionalism and endless
scandals. In the 1930s, his ideology formed the rock upon which
the New Deal was formed. Working hand-in-hand with President
Roosevelt, Norris used an economic crisis to direct Americans’
attention to people whose Great Depression began decades earlier
through a systematic pattern of neglect, underinvestment, and
environmental degradation. Through his determination, Norris
took a weapon of war, the Muscle Shoals project, and converted
it into an instrument for the public welfare. Fittingly, the TVA
would work to protect American democracy through a renewal
of equality and its defense against the forces of fascism. Senator
Norris’ strain of progressivism shunned individualism while
embracing communitarianism. It substantiated massive increases
in federal authority while illuminating the darkest of valleys. The
TVA was the public church for a new civil religion: a nationalist,
equalitarian, and materialist crusade for the betterment of the
people. Norris’ sermon was that the government’s responsibility
was the promotion of “happiness in this life” for all people,
nationwide. His mission lives on in the rivers he mastered, the
farms he electrified, and the futures he “Built for the People of
the United States.”
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